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Metacritical Observations on a Reductive Approach to Critical 
Theory: 
Ruane and Todd’s “The Application of Critical Theory” 
 
Piet Strydom 




In the previous volume of Political Studies1 Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd 
published an essay in which they seek to direct a methodological argument against 
critical theory. Since I am often taken to be a representative of critical theory,2 
although my self-understanding is somewhat more complex than is presupposed by 
such an -- admittedly not altogether wrong -- imputation, I cannot forego this 
opportunity to point out some difficulties in their argument and to make some 
suggestions as to a more consistent elaboration.  In addition, I must confess that I am 
by no means uninterested in methodological and, more broadly, epistemological 
issuers.  To be as to the point as possible, I propose to make observations on their 
essay in three areas: the position assumed by the authors, the basic concepts they 
employ in the presentation of this position, and the nature of the object of their 
critique. 
 Before embarking on a development of my essentially metacritical 
observations, however, I wish to express my appreciation for the willingness of the 
authors to take a general methodological position and thus to open the way for debate 
and hence the overcoming of the debilitating isolationism which, in my experience, is 
characteristic of a significant part of Irish academic life. 
 
 From Application to Verification 
As regards the general argument of Ruane and Todd, it must be emphasized at the 
outset that whereas they announce that the essay is intended to focus on the problem 
of the application of critical theory, it is in fact devoted less to this problem than to 
that of verification.  It would be worth our while, I think, to investigate this -- I 
suspect reductive -- move somewhat more closely. 
 The problem of the "application of critical theory to the practical world" 
(553),3 to begin with, is a rather complex one which basically concerns the question 
of the normative foundations of the social sciences or, more specifically, the re-
establishment of a relation between the social sciences and practical philosophy.4  
Judging from the writings of the last two decades which raise objections to critical 
theory, the problem of application has a least four dimensions:5 
 
1  the methodological dimension to which is central the question of the relation 
between norms and facts, which is often discussed in terms of the lack or not 
of value-freedom and objectivity; 
2  the hermeneutic dimension concerning the question of the content of practical 
principles, which is usually articulated under the titles of formalism and 
dogmatism; 
3  the social theoretic dimension involving the question of the rational 
organisation of society, which is as a rule confronted with such problems as 
terror, anarchy and refeudalization; and finally 




4  the philosophical dimension to which is central the question of grounding or 
justification, which is frequently considered from the point of view of 
foundationalism. 
 
 Ruane and Todd's conception of the problem of application is a variety of (1) 
above.  What is remarkable, however, is that they do not follow the usual line of 
criticizing the obliteration of the distinction between facts and norms in critical 
theory.  In fact, they seem to accept the legitimacy of the normative or, more 
specifically, the political and emancipatory orientation of critical theory -- a step that 
can be applauded.  The thrust of their methodological objection, concentrating on the 
factual pole as it does, rather consists of a demand that critical theory qua theory 
requires to be "empirically grounded and validated" (533; also 536, 537, 538) 
"through a closer relationship with empirical data" (537). 
 In a sense, this demand of theirs is a trivial one.  The leading critical theorists 
are well aware of the circumstance that since the normative foundations of critical 
theory6 do not guarantee the truth and objectivity of social scientific statements or 
propositions, immanent procedures and concrete analyses are and will remain a basic 
requirement of critical theoretical social scientific practice.  Taking experience 
seriously as they do, they moreover know perfectly well that one cannot doubt the 
testability of empirical statements unless one is also willing to deny the possibility of 
experience itself.  Given this recognition on the part of the critical theorists, however, 
I suspect that Ruane and Todd's demand is the outcome of a misunderstanding, 
admittedly also to be found among lesser representatives of critical theory, of the 
status of the practical principle that provides the normative foundation of critical 
theory.  To put it as concisely as possible, they mistakenly assume that the practical 
principle of critical theory represents not only the necessary but also the sufficient 
criterion for the rationality of discourses and forms of life which is applied 
independently of the understanding and evaluation of concrete situations. Critical 
theorists, by contrast, bring additional criteria into play through immanent procedures 
and concrete analyses in order to fulfil the sufficient conditions of critical theoretical 
social scientific practice.7  The crucial issue, therefore, is how the immanent 
procedures and concrete analyses (as well as the experience involved) are to be 
understood. 
 Although the title of Ruane and Todd's essay conjures up the image of a 
Popperian position, it soon becomes apparent that in strategic respects the authors 
assume a cruder what may be called inductivist-verificationist position.  It is from this 
point of view that one must understand their conception of immanent procedures and 
concrete analyses. I find support for the proposed interpretation of their general 
position in the stance they take on a whole range of issues.  Let me mention the most 
important instances: First, the authors indeed defer to post-empiricist philosophy of 
science, particularly the Popperian principle of the theory-impregnatedness of 
observation (537), yet their emphasis on the dependence of theory on observation 
(536, 537, 538) comes through still stronger, indeed to such an extent that it becomes 
clear that, despite all appeal to dialectics, they ultimately conceive of the relation 
between theory and research in inductive terms.  Secondly, they operate with a 
conception of social reality which displays an ontological prejudice shared by all the 
representatives of positivism as well as by Popper to a certain extent: they repeatedly 
speak of reality as consisting of "observable events and processes" (537), which 
means to say, in a manner that emphatically excludes the problem of meaning and its 
expression by human beings and their creations or products.8  Thirdly, the authors 




consistently yet mistakenly employ the Manichean view of the separation of theory 
and empirical research reminiscent of positivism in its heyday as a principle for the 
interpretation not only of the development of the philosophy of the social sciences, 
including the Positivist Dispute of the late 1960s (537), but also of critical theory 
itself (533, 536, 537).  In the fourth place, they operate with a conception of theory 
(e.g. 538) which is devoid of any appreciation of the connection between theory and 
background knowledge in the sense of a historically changing cognitive situation 
which fulfils something like a transcendental function.9  Fifthly, the authors exhibit a 
tendency, typical of positivism, towards the reduction of genuine epistemological 
issues, such as the theory-impregnatedness of observation or the constitution of the 
object of study, to methodological or even "practical" -- in the sense of research 
technical -- problems, while nevertheless advancing a covert epistemological 
position, namely that the goal of science is the building of "empirically grounded and 
validated theory" (538), with -- to be sure -- a very specific sense attaching to 
"theory".  Finally, the general inductivist-verificationist position assumed by the 
authors is conclusively betrayed by their emphatic concern with "empirical 
grounding" (533, 536, 537, 538) which could have meaning only within the context 
of the positivistic commitment to the truth function of basic observation statements 
relative to a reality consisting of singular states of affairs (i.e. "observable events and 
processes"). 
 Thus far I have endeavoured to draw out the presuppositions on which Ruane 
and Todd proceed in their methodological critique in order to show that their position 
entails a narrowing down of the problem of application to such a degree that a 
reductive and hence distortive approach to critical theory necessarily follows.  At this 
stage, it becomes necessary to be somewhat more specific. 
 
The Inadequacy of Some Basic Concepts Exposed 
One of the curious aspects of Ruane and Todd's essay resides in the fact that it breaks 
down in terms of its own most basic criterion, i.e. the methodological stipulation that 
the requirement of empirical reference must at all times be observed.  It proceeds on 
the -- dare I say theoretical? -- assumption that, despite the concern of the critical 
theorists with practical relevance, their work is essentially "theoretical and remote 
from concrete issues and problems" (533).  Later on, I will consider this position 
more meticulously from a methodological point of view, but for the moment I wish 
only to signal my astonishment and to point out that the authors are able to advance 
this claim only on the basis of a failure10 to take into account the concrete analyses 
undertaken by the critical theorists, some of which have lost little of their 
significance, in such areas as the economy, politics, the state, law, social psychology, 
the family, art and the mass media.  I suspect, however, that this failure rests less on 
the obvious unfamiliarity of our authors with the corpus of critical theoretical writings 
than on more pervasive and less easily corrigible difficulties.  As intimated earlier, I 
take these to hang together with an all too narrow concept of empirical reality and an 
equally inadequate concept of theory. 
 I have already drawn attention to Ruane and Todd's restricted ontology.  At 
this juncture it is necessary to underline that this prejudicial position implies that for 
them there is only one world, the self-sufficient external world, and only one correct 
social scientifically relevant empirical reality, consisting of observable events and 
processes.  Corresponding to this empirical reality, they moreover envisage an 
"empirically oriented" methodology with focuses on facts and regularities.  Although 
a gesture is made towards recognizing the "critical and theoretical standards" (533) of 




critical theory and hence its "practical political relevance" (534),11  our authors' 
demotion of epistemological issues to methodological or even research technical 
ones, mentioned above, renders them incapable of appreciating that, instead of there 
being one correct empirical reality, reality is actually empirically constituted by the 
subject of knowledge and thus by the same token socially constructed, with the result 
that there are not only different types of empirical reality depending on the rules 
according to which it is constituted or constructed, but also correspondingly different 
methodologies.  Consequently, what to the critical theorists is an eminently empirical 
matter, such as interpretable features of symbolically constructed reality (e.g. music, 
art, a philosophical system, poetry, etc.) or hidden features of the organisation of 
social relations (e.g. domination covered over by ideology or even fragmentation), 
appears to the authors not as something empirical at all but rather as mere theory in 
the sense of pure and hopeless speculation: "We are dealing, therefore, with theory 
constructed largely within the domain of theory whose relationship to concrete social 
and historical processes has yet to be established" (536).  Here, to be sure, we witness 
the most basic misunderstanding of critical theory by Ruane and Todd.  Failing to 
appreciate the empirical reality the critical theorists have in mind, they forcibly 
transpose it into what they regard as the theoretical domain, yet a domain in turn 
understood in a sense that makes it obvious from a critical theoretical point of view 
that here also an all too narrow vision projects correspondingly restrictive horizons.  
It must be recognized, by contrast, that not only is theory as variable as the types of 
empirical reality that can be constituted, but being connected to an all-pervasive 
background knowledge in the form of a historically changeable cognitive situation, it 
is continually subject to change so as to remain adequate to its object, historically 
changing societal reality.  The crucial point from the perspective of critical theory, 
moreover, is that theory is not just something about reality, as is assumed by Ruane 
and Todd, but theory is in fact part and parcel of reality itself.  I bet our authors will 
have difficulty understanding or accepting statements which bring to the fore this 
state of affairs, such as for example the following: 
 
"I am convinced that reflection, even when it is theoretical, on the structural 
components of new movements plays an important role in the growth of 
collective action". (Alberto Melucci) 
 
"It must be stated quite openly that the purpose of this (sociological - P. S.) 
research work is to contribute to the development of social movements.... Our 
real objective is to enable society to live at the highest possible level of 
historical action instead of blindly passing through crises and conflicts... I plan 
to construct the theory of social movements, in the conviction that my 
theoretical work will have the reflex effect of helping those collective actions 




"A critical theory of society has the task of developing enlightening situational 
interpretations which have a bearing on our self-understanding and orient us 
in our action". (Jürgen Habermas) 
 
 Against this backdrop it comes as a surprise to see the positions of Adorno 
and Habermas being criticized for being "theoreticist" (537, 537 footnote) and not 




"dialectical" (536, 537).  For Ruane and Todd, not the critical theorists, are the ones 
who clearly operate with an undialectical position which from a certain point of view 
may even be called theoreticist.  Support for this is to be found in their rejection of 
the employment of critical theory "as a means for the understanding of society" (536) 
as being a "simple application" (538) in favour of applying it in the sense of empirical 
verification with a view to "theory-building itself" (538): rather than assuming a 
dialectical position which relates theoretical and substantive issues for the purposes of 
furthering the understanding of society, theory becomes a goal in itself in a manner it 
would never do for a critical theorist.  Ultimately, however, this concern with theory-
building rests on what we in imitation of Ruane and Todd's neologism my call a 
"methodolgicist" tendency.  Adorno offers an admirable description of it in one of the 
works reviewed by our authors: 
 
"Not for nothing -- and quiet rightly as far as the logic of scientific procedures 
under discussion is concurred -- in discussion of empirical social research do 
question of method outweigh substantive questions.  As a criterion the dignity 
of the objects to be examined is frequently replaced by the objectivity of the 
findings which are to be ascertained by means of a method .... The pretence is 
made to examine an object by means of an instrument of research, which 
through its own formulation, decides what the object is".12 
 
 What must be insisted upon, therefore, is that a position operating with a 
conception of the empirical in the sense of the factual dimension can be dialectical, if 
at all, only in a rather partial or selective sense.  Simply witness Ruane and Todd's 
concept of dialectics. A truly dialectical position is one that conceives of the 
empirical with reference to the societal context as a whole, as suggested earlier.  This 
is the mark of critical theory, on the one hand, and on the other precisely what our 
authors find impossible to grasp.  For them it is merely a matter of a "simple 
application", whatever that is meant to convey.   The basic problem with Ruane and 
Todd's position, in my opinion, is that they accept the distinction between the 
theoretical and the empirical, and then seek to establish a so-called "dialectical" 
relation between them in order to break, first, the primacy of theory over data in 
favour of an "equal emphasis" (536) on both, and, secondly, the deductive relation 
between theory and research in favour of instituting an inductive one instead.13   
 A final matter I wish to touch on before leaving the topic of basic concepts is 
what Ruane and Todd repeatedly refer to as "empirical grounding and validity" (533, 
536, 537, 538) -- a concept absolutely fundamental to their position.  From a 
philosophical point of view, the expression "empirical grounding" appears 
problematic in that it glibly brings together matters which do not easily mix.  At any 
rate, it is clear that at best it is but a version of the naturalistic fallacy. Given the 
formula-like manner in which it is employed throughout the essay, I suspect that it 
represents a construct that is yet to be thought through.  I therefore challenge the 
authors to develop this concept in order to clarify their position.  If they choose to 
persist in pursuing a naturalistic epistemological-methodological line of thought, clear 
guidelines can be had from the realist philosophy of science represented by such 
authors as Rom Harré, Roy Bhaskar, Keat and John Urry.14  Considering the fact that 
the debate between critical theory and scientific realism has yet to take place, work 
along these lines could indeed turn out to be worthwhile.   An alternative -- and in my 
view a potentially more fruitful -- route, however, would roughly require the 
following steps: starting from the contradictory contemporary concept of the 




empirical, and attending throughout to the cognitive structures of the alternative (i.e. 
statistical-administrative and monographic-critical) orientations, reconstruct 
historically and theoretically the development of modern social research.  This 
exercise would eventually make clear the internally differentiated nature of the social-
epistemological construction or constitution of empirical reality and of the 
theoretical-methodological approaches to it.  If the authors follow this latter, 
admittedly more arduous route, it would sooner or later dawn on them that to make 
the specific demand of critical theory they do is tantamount to imposing an 
inappropriate (empiricist-inductivist) cognitive ideal on an enterprise with its own 
distinct and carefully constructed (critical-hermeneutical) cognitive ideal.  And as 
Adorno writes,15 one would have to respond to this kind of reductive demand that it 
 
"projects onto objects the desire for order which marks a classifying science, 
and which proclaims that it is elevated by objects.  The author, however, feels 
more inclined to give himself over to objects than to schematize like a 
schoolmaster -- for the sake of an external standard: a standard which, 
questionably, has been brought to bear on the subject matter from the 
outside". 
 
Disregard for the Dignity of the Object of Critique 
In this final section, I want to document the fact that Ruane and Todd severely 
underestimate the complexity of their object of critique, critical theory, particularly in 
the form given to it by Habermas.    
 In their overview of critical theory, the authors indeed make a distinction 
between Habermas' theory of modernity, on the one hand, and his theories of ethics 
and social evolution, on the other.  At the same time, they apparently also recognize 
the difference in the methodological status of these theories, i.e. the latter two being 
reconstructive theories which "inform and partially justify" the former theory (534).  
Although neither the specific differences nor the relations between the two types of 
theories are spelled out in detail, the overview nevertheless leads the reader to expect 
that appropriate conclusions would be drawn from the structure of critical theory for 
the purposes of the main argument.  This expectation is disappointed, however, in that 
there appears to be a discrepancy between the authors' presentation and their 
understanding of critical theory. As a consequence, their critique is not sufficiently 
differentiated to be cogent and convincing.  To clarify my argument, let me give a 
rough diagrammatic breakdown of the components of Habermas' position and then 
align Ruane and Todd's critique with it (see diagram below). 
  





THE STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY (ACCORDING TO HABERMAS)16 
 
LEVEL 1: Critical Hermeneutical Theory 
 CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY qua theory of modernity, particularly of late 
capitalism: 
 - theory of late capitalist reification (colonization of lifeworld) 
 - theory of late capitalist crisis tendencies 
 -theory of cultural modernity: cultural impoverishment 
          cultural mediation problems  
          fragmentation 
 
     relation of complementarity according to the criterion of mutual fit  
 
LEVEL 2: Philosophical-Theoretical Reconstruction  
      synchronic axis 
  THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
  - universal/formal pragmatics 
  - consensus theory of truth  
  - theory of argumentation 
  - theory of rationality 
  - communication/discourse ethics 
 
diachronic THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION 
_______________________________________________________ 
axis   
 
 From the diagram it should be clear that Habermas' position embraces a 
critical theory of society, consisting of various sub-theories, which methodologically 
takes the form of a critical-hermeneutical theory, and a complex of reconstructive 
theories made up of the theory of communicative action, consisting of various sub-
theories, and the theory of social evolution.  While the reconstructive theories of 
communicative action and social evolution, roughly speaking, relate to one another as 
the synchronic to the diachronic, the reconstructive and critical-hermeneutical 
components stand in a complementary relation according to the criterion of mutual 
fit, with the reconstructive component representing the a priori (in the sense of the 
relatively permanent interpretative background) and the critical-hermeneutical 
component the experiential dimension, again roughly speaking. 
 When we now relate Ruane and Todd's critique to the structure of critical 
theory as presented here, it becomes clear immediately that the former is much less 
complex that the latter.  Also here, I am convinced, one can legitimately speak of an 
unjustifiable reductionism.   Rather than recognising the distinct theoretical 
components and their differences in terms of methodological status, the authors 
mislead themselves by speaking globally of "Habermas' theory" (535, 536, 537) or 
simply of "the theory" (536) and then proceed to deal with critical theory accordingly.  
As a consequence, the same undifferentiated critique or interpretation is 
indiscriminately brought to bear on both the critical-hermeneutical component, or 
subparts or it, and the reconstructive theories.  We are fully entitled, therefore, to 
object with Adorno against the disregard for the dignity of the object and the 
superimposition of the self-satisfied empiricist-inductivist research enterprise over 
what is investigated we witness in Ruane and Todd's essay.  The basic rationale of 
critical theory is precisely to break conclusively with this kind of orientation.17 
  





1. Vol. XXXVI (1988), pp. 533-538. 
2 Joe Ruane, who is both a colleague of mine in the Department of Social 
Theory and Institutions, U.C.C., and a fellow-member of the Sociological 
Association of Ireland, where such an imputation is widespread, is aware of 
this.  It is in fact he who brought the essay under review to my attention. 
3 In the following Arabic numerals in parenthesis in the text refer to the essay 
under review. 
4 That Jürgen Habermas and his colleague and friend Karl-Otto Apel and, 
following them, the contemporary movement of critical theory are by no 
means alone in undertaking this task is clear from the widespread concern 
since the 1960s with the normative foundations of the social sciences inspired, 
for instance, by such authors as Paul Lorenzen, John Rawls, Charles Taylor as 
well as such significant events in the history of sociology as the Functionalist 
Debate and the Positivist Dispute. 
5 This is not an appropriate place to offer a bibliography of this rather extensive 
body of literature.  On the evaluation of this literature, however, compare the 
still relevant essay of Albrecht Wellmer, "Praktische Philosphie und Theorie 
der Gesellschaft", in Willi Oelmüller (ed.), Normen und Geschichte 
(Paderborn, Schöningh, 1979), pp. 140-174, particularly 144-146. 
6 What is meant here is, roughly speaking the principle of discourse of Apel and 
Habermas. 
7 Adorno, for instance, took pains to offer seminars on these problems, the 
impact of which can be see e.g. in Jürgen Ritsert, Inhaltsanalyse und 
Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt, Athenaum, 1972).  See also: Wolfgang Bonss and 
Axel Honneth (eds.), Sozialforschung als Kritik (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1982) 
and Wolfgang Bonss, Die Einübung des Tatsacheblicks: Zur Struktur und 
Verändernung empirischer Sozialforschung (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1982). 
8 Apel and Habermas, among the critical theorists, have consistently pointed out 
the importance of the problem of meaning and its epistemological and 
methodological consequences (not to mention its general philosophical 
relevance).  In Anglo-American philosophy and social science there is now 
also a tradition of acknowledging the fundamental difference between events 
and processes, on the one hand, and persons and their expressions/actions, on 
the other. 
9 This is a heavily discussed topic not only in critical theory but also in other 
directions in the philosophy of the social sciences, e.g. phenomenology 
(Alfred Schutz), analytic philosophy (Peter Winch, Thomas Kuhn, Charles 
Taylor), constructivism (Paul Lorenzen and the Erlangen School), reflexive 
sociology (Alvin Gouldner) and hermeneutics (Theodor Kisiel). 
10 As an example of this failure from the essay itself one may refer the reader to 
the poor assessment of Adorno's The Jargon of Authenticity which is 
presented as "a relatively simple introduction to some themes of his critical 
theory" (535), while it is actually --- and highly relevant for the main 
argument of the essay -- a demonstration of Adorno's application of his 
method of immanent critical-hermeneutical analysis in the form of a critique 
of the ideology of German existentialism as well as of its social consequences. 
11 But is it simply a matter of "practical political"? 
12 Theordor W. Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology 
(London, Heinemann, 1976), pp. 72-73. 




13 Compare the interesting comments of Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology 
of Mind (Frogmore, Paladin, 1973), pp. 23-25, whose epistemological-
methodological position is in many respects strikingly similar to that put 
forward by Apel and Habermas. 
14  Norman Stockman, "Habermas, Marcuse and the 'Aufhebung' of Science and 
Technology", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 8 (1978), pp. 15-35 e.g., 
offers some indications of a comparison of critical theory and the realist 
philosophy of science. 
15 The Jargon of Authenticity, p. xx 
16. Extracted for Piet Strydom, “Institutionalization in Critical Theoretical 
Perspective: Collective Learning, Social Movements and Social Change”, 
Protocol of Graduate Seminar, Department of Social Theory and Institutions, 
U.C.C., 1986-87, p.7 and from Piet Strydom, “Jürgen Habermas”, lecture 
delivered at One-Day Seminar on Modern Social Theory, Sociological 
Association of Ireland, Dublin, 1987, p.2.   For a critique of Habermas and an 
indication of my own position, see Piet Strydom, "Collective Learning: 
Habermas's Concessions and Their Theoretical Implication", Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, 13/3 (1987), pp. 165-182. 
17  This is also borne out by an investigation of the projects, ranging from the 
global capitalist system and contemporary capitalist societies through law and 
political freedoms to the development of moral consciousness and 
contemporary youth, undertaken by the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg 
under Habermas as its director of research for more than ten years during the 
1970s and early 80s. 
 
 
 
